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INTRODUCTION
Negotiators of multilateral environmental agreements are frequently faced with the
challenge of striking the right balance between stringency of commitment and breadth of
participation. A perfect agreement on paper, with strong commitments and a robust
compliance mechanism, might attract too few Parties (or too few key Parties) to achieve the
agreement’s environmental objective. Conversely, broad participation in a weak agreement
might also fail to accomplish the agreement’s goals.
This paper focuses on the various ways in which negotiators have worked to
encourage participation in multilateral environmental agreements. In some cases, they
involve steps taken before and during the negotiation of the agreement. In other cases, they
involve the provisions of the agreements themselves (such as various forms of flexibility,
incentives to join, and disincentives to remaining outside) or decisions taken by Parties after
agreements have entered into force.
Ultimately, States participate in agreements because they consider it in their
environmental, economic, and/or political interest to do so. There may be forces beyond
the four corners of environmental agreements that cause States to join them or implement
their provisions de facto.
o There may be bilateral or multilateral pressure to join or implement an agreement,
such as through diplomatic exchanges.
o The UN may call upon States to join or implement particular agreements, such as
through a UN General Assembly Resolution.
o A State may be lobbied domestically, e.g., by environmental NGOs or particular
industries.
o Another State(s) may restrict imports of a particular good if it does not meet a
particular international environmental standard.
o Another type of agreement, such as a trade agreement, may incorporate the
requirements of an environmental agreement, either directly or by reference.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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At the same time, negotiators of environmental agreements have employed a wide
variety of supplementary techniques, often in combination, to further encourage
participation. This paper focuses on such enticements and accommodations.

1. PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS
Participation in an agreement is likely to be increased if States are able to take part
in its negotiation. Early engagement may help them to shape the outcome and/or give
them a stake in an agreement’s success. As such, many negotiation processes provide for
financial assistance to enable representatives from States in need to attend the negotiating
rounds.
For example, the UN General Assembly Resolution establishing the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the development of a framework
convention on climate change established a special voluntary fund “to ensure that
developing countries, in particular the least developed among them, as well as small
island developing countries, are able to participate fully and effectively in the negotiating
process, and invites Governments, regional economic integration organizations and other
interested organizations to contribute generously to the fund….”1

2. MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS
A negotiating mandate, which sometimes acts as a pre-negotiation of an agreement
(at least on certain issues), can play an important role in promoting ultimate participation
in an agreement.

See paragraph 10 of UNGA Resolution 45/212,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm.
1
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A mandate might provide a helpful procedural element. For example, requiring that
the ultimate agreement be adopted by consensus may increase the chances for its broad
appeal down the road.
The choice of a particular negotiating forum may make a difference. In the case of
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, it was important to some countries that it be
negotiated under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, rather than the UN
Environment Program, given that the relevant issues (including development) extended
beyond environmental ones.2
A mandate might also contain provisions of substantive import, such as a
requirement that a particular element be either included in, or excluded from, the
agreement to be negotiated.
o During the development of the UNEP Governing Council’s decision to pursue the
negotiation of a legally binding instrument on mercury, it was important to certain
countries to secure the inclusion of provisions on financial assistance; it was
important to others that the mandate not provide for the future agreement to
address heavy metals other than mercury, either from the outset or through an
adding mechanism.3
o The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed, in the
“Berlin Mandate,” that the next agreement to be negotiated would not include any
“new commitments” for the Parties not included in Annex I of the Convention
(essentially developing countries). This exclusion contributed to the United States’
not joining the Kyoto Protocol; at the same time, for certain developing countries, it
enabled their participation in both the negotiation and the resulting Protocol.4

See paragraph 2 of UNGA Resolution 47/188,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/resolutions/47/188GA1992.html.
3 See Section III (Mercury) of UNEP Governing Council Decision 25/5,
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10623/K0950890%20GC-25-17-ProceedingsFINAL.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
4 See paragraph 2(b) of the Berlin Mandate, p. 5, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf.
2

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

3

Biniaz – Join the Parties

The so-called “Dubai pathway” played a key role in promoting the future
acceptability of an amendment to the Montreal Protocol on hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). It
contained a long list of topics to be discussed and/or included in the amendment, as well as
procedural guidance regarding the sequencing of issues to be resolved and the “package
deal” nature of the negotiation (“…nothing should be considered agreed until everything
is agreed”).5
It should also be noted that resolving a controversial issue upfront in a mandate may
shorten the time needed to negotiate an agreement; this in turn may enable greater
participation by States with limited financial or personnel resources.

3. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
States may choose to enhance the likelihood of wide participation in an agreement
by designing it as a “framework” convention (whether or not its title literally contains that
term). Such agreements tend to include an objective, general commitments, provisions on
cooperation (such as on science/research), institutional machinery (such as a “Conference
of the Parties” and a Secretariat), and provision for the adoption of protocols. Even States
with concerns or skepticism about the subject matter may be willing to join these types of
agreements, knowing that they will be able to decide later whether to join a protocol with
more specific/stringent commitments.
The framework approach has been employed frequently in the environmental field,
e.g., the Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution (“the LRTAP Convention”), the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Various regional

See Dubai pathway on hydrofluorocarbons, http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montrealprotocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/40856.
5
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seas agreements also serve as frameworks, with multiple protocols, e.g., the Barcelona
Convention (addressing the Mediterranean Sea) and the Cartagena Convention (addressing
the Caribbean Sea).
Generally speaking, a State may only join a protocol or other subsequent instrument
if it is a Party to the parent convention.6 This requirement may have the effect of promoting
participation in the parent convention or, in the case of non-Parties to such convention,
inhibiting participation in the protocol/other instrument.

4. SOFTENING COMMITMENTS
The substantive content of an agreement’s commitments can significantly affect
prospects for participation. In some contexts, States may agree on the need for stringent,
iron-clad commitments; the Antarctic Environmental Protocol reflects many such
provisions. In other cases, it may be necessary to soften one or more commitments in order
to attract wide participation.
o Phrases such as “as appropriate” and “as far as practicable” are often used to make
commitments more flexible and therefore more widely acceptable.
o Certain verbs (such as “endeavor,” “seek to,” or “make best efforts”) may be used
to make a commitment require a particular behavior, rather than a particular result.
o Provisos may be attached to commitments, such as “taking into account national
priorities and capacities.”
The softening may apply to a particular commitment of concern or more broadly.
For example, the Biodiversity Convention moderates many of its commitments with the
phrase “as far as possible and as appropriate” or “in accordance with [a Party’s] particular
conditions and capabilities.”7 Similarly, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the

6
7

See, e.g., Article 37.1 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/.
See the Biodiversity Convention, https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf.
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Ozone Layer introduces several of its general obligations with the phrase “in accordance
with the means at their [the Parties’] disposal and their capabilities.”8

5. DIFFERENTIATED COMMITMENTS
To a much greater degree than many other fields of international law, environmental
agreements often contain differentiated commitments for a particular group(s) or type(s) of
Parties.
States have suggested a variety of reasons for seeking distinct treatment, e.g.:
o limited capacity (such as least developed countries);
o geography (such as the United States and Canada in transboundary air pollution
agreements that are largely focused on Europe);
o fairness (such as States that took early action or those that did not contribute as
much to an environmental problem as other States);
o economic reasons (such as countries with economies in transition);
o ideology (such as developing countries seeking a per se distinction from developed
countries);
o membership in a regional economic integration organization, such as the EU;
o application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities in certain contexts;
o special situations (such as small island developing States, vulnerable States, or a
State(s) with an anomalous circumstance); or
o the need to develop (such as some or all developing countries).
An agreement might notionally distinguish particular Parties through a description
(“those Parties that…”), a category (members of the OECD), self-identification (“if a Party

See Article 2.2 of the Vienna Convention, http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-vienna-conventionprotection-ozone-layer/2205.
8
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considers that it…”), a list (Annex X), a function (all exporting States), or a combination.
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol sets out one accommodation based on selfselection plus the endorsement of the Meeting of the Parties, while another (for countries
with “high ambient temperature”) is based on factual criteria.9
Differentiation might take the form of, e.g.:
o exclusion from commitments (such as the Kyoto Protocol’s exclusion of non-Annex
I Parties from emissions targets);10
o entirely different commitments (such as U.S. and Canadian commitments under
the LRTAP Convention’s Gothenburg Protocol, which are distinct from those that
apply to European Parties);11
o longer timeframes or different baselines (see below); or
o self-defined commitments (see below).
Several of the LRTAP Convention’s Protocols accommodate countries with large
land mass, such as Russia, by allowing Parties to choose to regulate the transboundary fluxes
of a pollutant rather than the national emissions of such pollutant.12
An agreement might also provide for differentiation in a less explicit manner, such
as through clauses that take account of national priorities, capacities, capabilities, and/or

See the Kigali Amendment, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/document/full-text-kigaliamendment-pt-1.
10 See, e.g., Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
11 See Article 3.11 of the Gothenburg Protocol,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1999%20Multi.E.Amended.2005.pdf
12 See, e.g., Article 2.2 of the Volatile Organic Compounds Protocol,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1991.VOC.e.pdf.
9
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circumstances. 13 The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents
subjects certain obligations to the “framework of [each Party’s] legal system.”14
Finally, an agreement might distinguish particular types of Parties not through
differentiating commitments, but by recognizing such Parties in other ways.
o The UN Convention to Combat Desertification calls for Parties to give “priority” to
affected African country Parties.15
o The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change lists several different
categories of developing country Parties (e.g., those with arid areas, those prone to
natural disasters, those with low-lying coastal areas) as meriting particular
consideration in terms of their specific needs and concerns. 16

6. EXTRA TIME
An agreement might impose identical substantive commitments on all Parties but
allow extra time for some or all Parties to achieve them.
o The London Protocol on ocean dumping, through what it called a “transitional
period,” permitted any Party, for a limited period after entry into force, to take up
to five years to implement certain commitments.17
See, e.g., Article 14 of the Minamata Convention on Mercury (whose provisions on capacitybuilding, technical assistance, and technology transfer take account of Parties’ respective
capabilities),
http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/conventionText/Minamata%20Convent
ion%20on%20Mercury_e.pdf.
14 See Article 7 of the Industrial Accidents Convention,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2006/teia/Convention%20E%20no%20anne
x%20I.pdf.
15 See Article 7 of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, http://www.unccd.int/en/aboutthe-convention/Pages/Text-overview.aspx.
16 See Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
17 See Article 26 of the London Protocol,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/PROTOCOLAmended2006.pdf
13
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o The original Montreal Protocol and several of its amendments provide a ten-year
grace period for so-called “Article 5 Parties” (those developing countries whose per
capital consumption of CFCs is below a certain threshold).18
o The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, in addition to providing a grace
period for Article 5 Parties generally, allows four additional years for a subset of
Article 5 Parties with “high ambient temperature” (and therefore a greater need for
refrigerants). The Amendment also provides certain additional time for a sub-set
of non-Article 5 Parties that includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan.19
o A 2012 amendment to the LRTAP Convention’s Gothenburg Protocol provided for
“flexible transitional arrangements” to encourage the accession of new Parties
(principally in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe).20

7. CHOICE OF BASELINE
Several agreements provide Parties with flexibility concerning the baseline that
applies (or that they may choose to apply) to a particular commitment. In many cases, it
may simply not be viable (whether because of fairness or lack of sufficient data) for all

See Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
See Article 1 of the Kigali Amendment and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Decision XXVIII/2,
https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/document/full-text-kigali-amendment-pt-1, and [ADD
CITE].
20 See Section E, adding Article 3bis to the Gothenburg Protocol (amendment not yet in force),
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2013/air/ECE_EB.AIR_111_Add.1__ENG_
DECISION_2.pdf.
18
19
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Parties to be asked to limit or reduce their emissions of X in relation to what their emissions
were in year Y.
For example, many climate-related instruments reflect baseline flexibility:
o The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provided a “certain degree of
flexibility” to countries “undergoing the process of transition to a market
economy.”21 The Conference of the Parties later translated this flexibility into the
ability of these Parties to use 1986 as their baseline for the Convention’s year-2000
greenhouse gas emissions aim, rather than the 1990 baseline that applied to other
Annex I Parties. The premise was that a 1990 baseline would have been unfair to
such countries, given their diminished economic situations (and consequent lower
levels of emissions) in that year.
o The Kyoto Protocol allowed a Party to choose 1995 (instead of 1990) as its baseline
for the three synthetic gases covered by the Protocol’s emissions targets.22 Some
Parties had insisted that their use of those three gases in 1990 was too low to be
used as an appropriate baseline for reductions during the 2008-2012 Kyoto
commitment period.
o The Paris Agreement provides for Parties to “nationally determine” their emissions
targets, including with respect to the applicable baseline.23 (The EU’s 2030 target is
in relation to 1990 emissions levels, for example, while the U.S. 2025 target is in
relation to 2005 emissions levels.)
The NOx Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
sets 1987 as the baseline for commitments, but permits a Party to pick an earlier year if it

See Article 4.6 of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
22 See Article 3.8 of the Kyoto Protocol, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
23 See Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
21
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meets certain conditions.24 (The absence of baseline flexibility in the SO2 Protocol caused
the United States not to be a party, given that it would have received no credit for earlier
reductions.)

8. RESERVATIONS
While some environmental agreements prohibit reservations entirely,

25

other

agreements, expressly or through silence, permit Parties to take reservations.26 In the latter
cases, negotiators have presumably determined that it is better for the agreement’s
environmental objective to have less-than-full implementation than risk the complete
absence of Parties.
An agreement might permit reservations with respect to the entire agreement (such
as the Aarhus Convention, by silence) 27 or only certain provisions. As examples of the
latter:
o The Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats contains a
limited reservation clause, which permits a Party to reserve with respect to any
particular species of bat.28

See Article 2.1 of the NOx Protocol,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1988.NOX.e.pdf.
25 See, e.g., Article 37 of the Biodiversity Convention, https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/, and
Article 27 of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/2232/Default.aspx.
26 See section 2 (reservations) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf.
27 See the Aarhus Convention,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.
28 See Article VIII of the Eurobats Agreement,
http://www.eurobats.org/official_documents/agreement_text.
24
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o The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”) similarly
provides for limited reservations, including with respect to the listing of particular
species. 29
Prospective Parties may also take advantage of understandings and/or declarations
to facilitate or even enable their participation. For example, with respect to the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal (“the Basel Convention”), several Parties (including, e.g., Germany, Japan,
Singapore) submitted declarations to the effect that the provisions of the Convention do not
affect the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms as provided in international law. 30

9. SELF-DETERMINED COMMITMENTS
Some agreements invite greater participation by permitting Parties to fashion their
own commitments.
o The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl
Habitat (the “Ramsar Convention”) provides for each Party to designate wetlands
(at a minimum, one) within its territory for inclusion in the “List of Wetlands of
International Importance.”31
o The Paris Agreement provides for each Party to design its own “nationally
determined contribution” with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.32 This
approach stands in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, under which Parties’ emissions
targets were negotiated and enshrined in the agreement. Because the Paris
Agreement was to apply to all countries (not just developed countries, as had been

See Article XXIII of CITES, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php.
See
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/PartiesSignatories/tabid/4499/Default.aspx.
31 See Article 2 of the Ramsar Convention,
https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/scan_certified_e.pdf.
32 See Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
29
30
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the case under Kyoto), and because the United States had failed to join the Kyoto
Protocol in part because of its negotiated target, it was important to structure Paris
so as to maximize both worldwide participation and that of key countries.
In some cases, commitments are set by the agreement, but a Party gets to selfdetermine whether a particular commitment applies to it. In the Minamata Convention on
Mercury, for example, certain commitments relating to artisanal and small-scale gold
mining apply only to a Party in whose territory such mining/processing is “more than
insignificant.” Each Party determines whether its level of mining/processing meets that
standard.33

10.DEFINITIONS
Some environmental agreements include definitions that result in providing
flexibility to Parties indirectly.
o In the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (i.e., the
NAFTA environmental side agreement), for example, there are country-specific
definitions of “territory” for Canada, Mexico, and the United States that inform
their respective substantive obligations.34
o The Basel Convention, which regulates transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes, defines “wastes” in part by reference to the respective national laws of the
Parties.35

See Article 7 of the Minamata Convention on Mercury,
http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/conventionText/Minamata%20Convent
ion%20on%20Mercury_e.pdf.
34 See Annex 45 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
http://www.cec.org/about-us/NAAEC.
35 See Article 2 of the Basel Convention, which defines “wastes” as “substances or objects which
are disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the
provisions of national law,”
http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf.
33
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o The Caribbean region’s Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and
Wildlife (“the SPAW Protocol”) accords individual Parties certain latitude over
which of their terrestrial areas are included within the geographic scope of the
agreement.36
o The Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context defines a major term – “proposed activity” – with reference to what is
subject to the decision of a competent authority under the respective national
procedures of the Parties.37

11. LEGAL CHARACTER
The legal character of commitments is often a controversial aspect of negotiations,
one that can potentially serve to deter or facilitate participation.
The issue of legal character may involve an entire instrument. For example, the
Copenhagen Accord38 and the United Nations forest instrument (formerly known as the
non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests)39 are entirely non-legally binding.
In other cases, the legal character issue relates to particular commitments. Strictly
speaking, the issue is a binary one -- a commitment is either legally binding or it is not –
and either choice may promote participation by certain Parties. However, there are also
shades of nuance that can help to make an agreement more widely acceptable.
As noted above, a legally binding commitment might be softened by relating it to a
Party’s behavior, rather than a specified result.

See Article 1(c) of the SPAW Protocol, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/SPAW%20Protocolen%20(1).pdf.
37 See Article 1(v) of the Espoo Convention, https://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/eia_text.html.
38 See the Copenhagen Accord, COP Decision 2/CP.15, p. 4,
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
39 See the United Nations forest instrument, UNGA Resolution 62/98, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/469/65/PDF/N0746965.pdf?OpenElement, renamed by UNGA
Resolution 70/199, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/450/10/PDF/N1545010.pdf?OpenElement.
36
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Further, an agreement might reflect a hybrid of legally binding and non-legally
binding provisions that is designed to bring all potential Parties on board.

Such

combinations have been particularly important in the climate change regime.
o The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change generally contains legally
binding commitments. However, the provision that relates to Annex I Parties
returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels in the year 2000 is not
legally binding.40
o Parties to the Paris Agreement are legally required to submit “nationally
determined contributions” with respect to their mitigation efforts but they are not
required to achieve them.41
There may even be shades of acceptability within non-binding provisions, such as
the distinction between “may” and “should” found in certain articles of the Paris
Agreement.42

12. SINGLE-COUNTRY ACCOMMODATIONS
Sometimes negotiators accommodate the concerns or situation of a particular State.
The accommodation may be made because the participation of that State is important for
the agreement, because the State might otherwise block consensus, because the
accommodation makes sense on the merits, or otherwise. Generally, such provisions do
not name names, but they are often drafted so specifically that they could not realistically
apply to any other State.

See Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
41 See Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
42 See, e.g., Article 7.10 of the Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
40
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o The original Montreal Protocol included a provision that was written expressly for
the situation of the Soviet Union. It was so specific that it was improbable that it
would apply to any other State:
“Any Party not operating under Article 5, that has facilities for the
production of Annex A or Annex B controlled substances under construction,
or contracted for, prior to 16 September 1987, and provided for in national
legislation prior to 1 January 1987, may add the production from such
facilities to its 1986 production of such substances for the purposes of
determining its calculated level of production for 1986, provided that such
facilities are completed by 31 December 1990 and that such production does
not raise that Party’s annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled
substances above 0.5 kilograms per capita.”43
o A similarly limited accommodation was made for Iceland with respect to
accounting for emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.44 It applied only to States in
which, among other things, industrial process CO2 emissions from a “single
project” added in any one year of the commitment period more than five per cent
of the total CO2 emissions of that State in 1990 (the baseline year).
o The LRTAP Convention’s Protocol on Heavy Metals provides an exception for any
Party whose “total land area is greater than 6,000,000 km2” (which includes
Canada, Russia, and the United States from within the LRTAP region).45
o The Minamata Convention on Mercury contains certain accommodations intended
to allow the United States to implement the agreement under existing U.S. law.
They are not as specific to a particular country as the Montreal Protocol or Kyoto
See Article 2.6 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocolsubstances-deplete-ozone-layer/25419.
44 See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=68.
45 See Article 3.7 of the Protocol on Heavy Metals,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1998.Heavy.Metals.e.pdf.
43
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Protocol examples. They permit any Party to take an alternative approach to
regulating products containing mercury if it fulfills certain other requirements,
which could conceivably also apply to countries other than the United States.46
Some agreements do name names. Under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, the United States and Mexico are subject to one enforcement
procedure, while an alternative one expressly applies to Canada.47

13. FLEXIBILITY IN IMPLEMENTATION
An agreement might balance stringency, on the one hand, with multiple forms of
flexibility, on the other.
With the notable exception of the United States, the Kyoto Protocol was able to attract
the participation of Annex I Parties by combining stringent, legally binding emissions
targets with a significant number of flexibility elements in relation to implementation. 48
o While top-line targets were prescribed, Parties were free to achieve them through
laws, policies, or other measures of their choosing.
o The Protocol did not prescribe specific targets for individual greenhouse gases, but
rather took a “basket” approach that permitted Parties to achieve their targets
through the combination they deemed appropriate.
o To a limited degree, Parties could choose to achieve their targets by enhancing
removal of greenhouse gases by sinks (such as forests) rather than by reducing
emissions.
o Five-year commitment periods allowed for multi-year averaging.

See Article 4.2 of the Minamata Convention on Mercury,
http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%2
0on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdf.
47 See Annex 36A of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
http://www.cec.org/about-us/NAAEC.
48 See the Kyoto Protocol, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
46
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o There was some ability to deviate from the general 1990 baseline. As noted above,
Parties could choose 1995 for the three synthetic gases. Further, Parties with
economies in transition could choose an earlier baseline, and those for which “landuse change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in
1990” could make adjustments to their baseline.
o A Party could add unused emission allowances to its allowance for the next
commitment period.
o Parties (such as, but not limited to, EU Member States) could achieve their targets
jointly.
o Parties could take advantage of various Kyoto mechanisms, including emissions
trading among Annex I Parties and project offsets in Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties, to help achieve their targets.

14. NO PREJUDICE
Sometimes prospective Parties may be more likely to join an agreement if, by doing
so, they have not prejudiced their ability to argue for a different outcome on a particular
issue in a future agreement.
o The Espoo Convention, for example, makes clear that its voting procedure (i.e.,
super-majority voting if consensus cannot be reached) “is not intended to
constitute a precedent for future agreements negotiated within the Economic
Commission for Europe.”49
o The Montreal Protocol’s financial mechanism, which was added by the London
Amendment in 1990, was expressly “without prejudice to any future arrangements

See Article 14.6 of the Espoo Convention,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authenti
c_ENG.pdf.
49
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that may be developed with respect to other environmental issues.” 50 Some
countries, including the United States, were concerned that it would become a
precedent for a future agreement on climate change.

15. FINANCIAL/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
For some countries, particularly developing countries, their participation may
depend in part on whether an agreement provides for technical and/or financial assistance.
Of those environmental agreements that include assistance provisions, some address
it quite generally. For example, the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and
Petrels in the Southern Hemisphere provides for Parties to “endeavor to provide training,
technical and financial support to other Parties…to assist them in implementing the
provisions of [the] Agreement.”51
At the other end of the spectrum, some agreements are specific about which Parties
are to provide financial assistance, which Parties are eligible to receive it, and/or the
mechanism for its delivery.
o The Biodiversity Convention specifies that developed countries are to provide
resources, that developing countries are the beneficiaries, and that the Parties are to
designate an institutional structure to operationalize the Convention’s financial
mechanism.
o Rather than designate an outside institution, the London Amendment to the
Montreal Protocol established a dedicated “Multilateral Fund” to serve the
Protocol.
In some cases, an agreement may draw a link between implementation and
financial/technical assistance. For example, the Montreal Protocol (through its London
See Article 10.10 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/MontrealProtocol2000.pdf.
51 See Article VII.4 of the Albatrosses and Petrels Agreement, http://www.cms.int/en/conventiontext.
50

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

19

Biniaz – Join the Parties

Amendment), the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Biodiversity
Convention all include a factual statement to the effect that the extent to which developing
country Parties will effectively implement their commitments will depend upon the
effective implementation by developed countries of their commitments related to
financial/other assistance.52
Assistance might also be available before a State joins an agreement – in order to put
it in a position to carry out its commitments once it joins. Environmentally speaking, it may
be better to take the time to ensure that a State can implement an agreement than to have it
become a Party prematurely. The London Protocol, for example, provides for the IMO to
assist developing countries and those in transition to market economies that have declared
their intention to join the Protocol to “examine the means necessary to achieve full
implementation.” 53

16. COMPLIANCE/IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
Mechanisms to promote compliance and/or implementation can play a role in
making an agreement more widely acceptable.
In some cases, States may be looking for a robust mechanism. Particularly if an
agreement is to contain strong commitments with potential economic impact, States may
seek to ensure that they are not put at a competitive disadvantage by another Party’s failure
to comply. For these and other reasons (such as ensuring the integrity of the Protocol’s
market mechanisms), the Kyoto Protocol, for example, provides for a relatively stringent
“enforcement branch” that applies to its legally binding emissions targets.54

See Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC, Article 2.5 of the Montreal Protocol, and Article 20.4 of the
Biodiversity Convention.
53 See Article 13.2 of the London Protocol,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/PROTOCOLAmended2006.pdf
54 See description at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php.
52
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The Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental Protection provides for strong
compliance mechanisms, including the applicability of mandatory arbitration, with binding
consequences, in relation to several of its annexes.55 Here the likely impetus is the unique
and fragile Antarctic environment, rather than competitiveness concerns.
In other cases, States (or at least some of them) may be concerned about mechanisms
that they view as adversarial or potentially punitive. For this reason, most environmental
agreements provide for only voluntary recourse to the International Court of Justice or
binding arbitration, and many agreements provide a softer alternative. These alternatives,
whether referred to as “non-compliance” procedures, 56 “compliance” procedures, 57 or a
“multilateral consultative process,” 58 can vary in many respects (e.g., what triggers the
process and potential outcomes), but they have in common that they are multilateral in
nature and are intended to be ”friendlier” than traditional compliance mechanisms.

17. URGING NON-PARTIES TO JOIN/IMPLEMENT
Some agreements put an affirmative obligation on Parties to encourage non-Parties
to join.
Such provisions are found in many fisheries-related agreements. For example, both
the Port State Measures Agreement and the Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas

See Article 19 of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol,
http://www.ats.aq/documents/recatt/Att006_e.pdf.
56 See Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
57 See Article 11 of the London Protocol,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/PROTOCOLAmended2006.pdf
58 See Article 13 of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
55
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(“the FAO Compliance Agreement”) require Parties to encourage non-Parties to join the
Agreement and/or adopt laws and regulations consistent with the Agreement.59 60
Under the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South
Pacific, Parties have an obligation to “consult” with non-Parties regarding driftnet fishing
activities that “appear to adversely affect” conservation of marine living resources within
the Convention area; further, they are to “seek to reach agreement” concerning the
prohibitions under the Convention.61

18. TAKING UNSPECIFIED MEASURES AGAINST NON-PARTIES
Some agreements go beyond requiring Parties to urge non-Parties to join or
implement.
o Some fisheries-related agreements obligate Parties to exchange information with
respect to activities of fishing vessels flying the flags of non-Parties that undermine
the effectiveness of international fisheries-related conservation/management
measures.62
o Such agreements may contain a further obligation to cooperate “to the end that”
such vessels “do not engage” in such activities.63 It is not specified exactly which
measures Parties are to take, but the fact that the obligation is bounded by
consistency with international law suggests they might include, inter alia, trade

See Article 23.1 of the Port State Measures Agreement, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1644t.pdf.
See Article VIII (1) of the FAO Compliance Agreement,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/012t-e.pdf
61 See Article 5 of the Driftnet Convention, https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/1989prohibitiondriftnetssouthpacificentxt.
62 See, e.g., Article VIII (3) of the FAO Compliance Agreement,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/012t-e.pdf.
63 See, e.g., Article VIII (2) of the FAO Compliance Agreement,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/012t-e.pdf.
59
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measures with respect to fish caught in a manner inconsistent with the agreement
in question.
o The Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears requires Parties to “take action as
appropriate” to promote compliance with the Agreement by nationals of States not
party….”64
The Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental Protection contains two
provisions of note.
o The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings are to “draw the attention of any State
which is not a Party…to any activity undertaken by that State, its agencies,
instrumentalities, natural or juridical persons, ships, aircraft or other means of
transport which affects the implementation of the objectives and principles” of the
Protocol.65
o Further, each Party is to “exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of
the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity contrary to this
Protocol.”66
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(“MARPOL”) provides that, with respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention,
Parties are required to apply to Convention’s requirements “as may be necessary to ensure
that no more favourable treatment is given to such ships.”67

See Article VIII of the Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears,
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/polar.bears.1973.html.
65 See Article 13 of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol,
http://www.ats.aq/documents/recatt/Att006_e.pdf; Article X of the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources contains a similar provision,
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/camlr-convention-text.
66 See Article 13 of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol,
http://www.ats.aq/documents/recatt/Att006_e.pdf.
67 See Article 5(4) of MARPOL,
http://www.marpoltraining.com/MMSKOREAN/MARPOL/intro/a5.htm.
64
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19. TRADE CONTROLS VIS-À-VIS NON-PARTIES
Several environmental agreements expressly limit Parties’ trade with non-Parties in
the good(s) that is the subject of the agreement. Such provisions are generally intended to
prevent leakage or unfair advantage (“free riding”) but may also have the effect of
encouraging non-Parties to participate, either de jure (by joining the agreement) or de facto
(by implementing the substantive provisions of the agreement).
o The Montreal Protocol restricts Parties from trading with non-Parties in the
substances controlled under the Protocol (such as CFCs).68 The restriction does not
apply if the non-Party is in de facto compliance with key provisions of the Protocol;
the compliance determination is made by the Meeting of Parties. (Even if a State is
a Party to the Protocol, it is considered a non-Party with respect to a controlled
substance if it has not joined the particular amendment controlling that substance.)
o The Basel Convention prohibits a Party from trading with a non-Party in
hazardous wastes covered by the Convention, unless those two States have an
agreement or arrangement that provides the equivalent stringency of the
Convention.69 (Certain “grandfathered” agreements and arrangements are subject
to a lower standard.) Unlike under the Montreal Protocol, it is the Party trading
with the non-Party under such an agreement or arrangement that determines the
extent to which it meets the Basel standard.
o Under CITES, a Party may trade with a non-Party in CITES-covered species if the
non-Party issues “comparable documentation” that “substantially conforms” to the
Convention’s requirements.70

See Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
See Articles 4.5 and 11 of the Basel Convention,
http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf.
70 See Article X of CITES, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php#X.
68
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o The Biodiversity Convention’s Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety addresses
“transboundary movements of living modified organisms” between Parties and
non-Parties, but in very general terms. Such movements are to be “consistent with
the objective” of the Protocol.71
In some cases, steps need to be taken to avoid an impact on too many non-Parties.
For example, amendments to the Montreal Protocol have specified low thresholds for early
into force (e.g., twenty Parties). If new trade controls under the Protocol were to become
effective immediately upon entry into force, they would apply to an enormous number of
States. For this reason, the amendments have generally provided for delayed application
of the trade control provisions. In the case of the Kigali Amendment on HFCs, the target
date for entry into force of the trade provisions is a full ten years after the other provisions
(2029 vs. 2019), and 70 (vs. 20) instruments must have been deposited.72

20. ABILITY TO GO BEYOND THE AGREEMENT
Countries often seek an assurance that joining an agreement will not preclude them
from taking measures that are more stringent than the agreement’s terms.
Many environmental agreements contain such an assurance.
o The Aarhus Convention, for example, provides that it does not affect “the right of a
Party to maintain or introduce measures providing for broader access to
information, more extensive public participation in decision-making and wider
access to justice in environmental matters than required by this Convention.”73

See Article 24 of the Biosafety Protocol, https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/.
See Article IV.2 of the Kigali Amendment, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/document/fulltext-kigali-amendment-pt-1.
73 See Article 3.5 of the Aarhus Convention,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.
71
72
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o The Espoo Convention contains a similar provision.74
Particularly in the context of agreements that relate to trade, these provisions often
include a reference to international law, meaning that, while the agreement in question does
not preclude or limit more stringent measures, other sources of international law (such as
WTO rules) might.

Examples include the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed

Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade 75 and the Basel Convention. 76 An international law clause may also appear in a
marine pollution agreement, such as the International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships,77 where it presumably refers to the law of the sea.

21. “TACIT” AMENDMENTS
Some agreements use tacit amendment procedures, which flip the usual
presumption; instead of a Party being bound by an amendment only if it affirmatively joins
it, an amendment applies to a Party unless it affirmatively opts out. The tacit procedure
serves to promote participation in two different ways.
o The approach generally broadens the applicability of an amendment (by avoiding
the need for ratification), as well as accelerates it (given how lengthy many States’
ratification procedures can be).

See Article 2.9 of the Espoo Convention,
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authenti
c_ENG.pdf.
75 See, e.g., Article 15.4 of the Rotterdam Convention,
http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/RotterdamConventionText/ta
bid/1160/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
76 See Article 4.11 of the Basel Convention,
http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf.
77 See Article 1.3 of the Anti-Fouling Convention,
http://www.flagadmin.com/middleware/filemanager/userfiles/LIBRARY/2001InternationalConve
ntionontheControlofHarmfulAnti-foulingSystemsonShips-pdf.pdf.
74
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o The opt-out feature can increase participation in the underlying agreement by
providing future Parties with an assurance that they do not have to be bound by an
amendment that they find unacceptable.
While the tacit procedure is often associated with amendments of a more technical
nature, 78 this is not always the case.

Some of the most high-profile environmental

agreements apply the procedure to amendments that are both significant and substantive.
o The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, for example, permits
a Party to object to the addition of a new regulation to the Schedule, in which case
it is not bound.79
o CITES uses the procedure for additions to Appendices I and II (which list
specimens of species covered by the Convention).80
In certain cases, such as where uniformity is important or where there might be
competitiveness concerns, the procedure may provide for an amendment to apply to all
Parties, without the possibility of opting out.
o So-called “adjustments” to the Montreal Protocol (which modify the regulation of
an ozone-depleting substance that is already controlled under the Protocol) apply
to all Parties automatically.81

See, e.g., Article 16 of the UNFCCC (which restricts the tacit procedure to “lists, forms and any
other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative
character”),
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
79 See Article V of the International Whaling Convention,
https://www.animallaw.info/treaty/international-convention-regulation-whaling.
80 See Article XV of CITES, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php#XV.
81 See Article 2.9 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
78
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o Amendments to certain annexes of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants apply to all Parties; the inability to opt out is mitigated by the
requirement that such amendments be adopted by consensus.82
Some countries may be uncomfortable signing up to an agreement where
amendments will automatically bind them unless they take an affirmative step. They may
be concerned that it will be difficult to keep track of such amendments and their limited
timeframes for opting out and/or they may want to keep open prerogatives for their
legislature to approve such amendments. To address this concern, the Convention to
Combat Desertification provides for a Party to re-flip the presumption with respect to itself,
i.e., it will be bound by a tacit amendment only if it affirmatively joins it. 83

This

accommodation has been repeated in several other agreements, e.g., the Stockholm
Convention. 84

The inclusion of such a modified tacit amendment procedure in an

agreement promotes participation in three ways:
o by broadening participation in a given amendment;
o by inviting participation in the underlying agreement by those States potentially
concerned about being bound by a particular amendment; and
o by inviting participation in the underlying agreement by those States potentially
concerned about being bound by any amendment without its express approval.

22. ENTRY INTO FORCE CLAUSES
Entry into force provisions can be designed to promote participation.

See Article 22.5 of the Stockholm Convention, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/UNEP-POPSCOP-CONVTEXT-2009.En%20(1).pdf.
83 See Article 34.4 of the Desertification Convention,
http://www2.unccd.int/sites/default/files/relevant-links/201701/UNCCD_Convention_ENG_0.pdf.
84 See Article 25.4 of the Stockholm Convention, file:///C:/Users/sbiniaz/Downloads/UNEP-POPSCOP-CONVTEXT-2009.En%20(1).pdf.
82
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Negotiators might set a high numerical threshold for entry into force, thereby
providing an incentive for many States to join (or at least precluding entry into force if they
do not). The entry into force of the Convention to Combat Desertification, for example,
required fifty instruments to be deposited.85
A weighted entry into force clause can promote the participation of particular types
of States or even one or more combinations of particular States.
o For example, the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL 73/78”) required fifteen States, “the
combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross
tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping….”86
o The Montreal Protocol required not only that at least eleven States/REIOs join, but
they needed to represent at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption
of the controlled substances.87
o The Kyoto Protocol required not only fifty-five UNFCCC Parties to join, but they
needed to include Annex I Parties accounting for at least 55 % of Annex I CO2
emissions in 1990.88
Participation can also be spurred by setting a target date for entry into force. Such
date does not change the entry-into-force threshold(s) but can accelerate States’ efforts to
join. For example, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on HFCs provides that
it “shall enter into force on 1 January 2019, provided that at least twenty instruments…have

See Article 36 of the Desertification Convention, http://www.unccd.int/en/about-theconvention/Pages/Text-Part-VI.aspx#art36.
86 See Article V of MARPOL 73/78, http://library.arcticportal.org/1699/1/marpol.pdf.
87 See Article 16 of the Montreal Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
88 See Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
85
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been deposited.” It further provides that, if the condition has not been fulfilled by that date,
it will enter into force ninety days after the condition has been fulfilled.89

23. PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
An agreement (or its adopting instrument) might provide for a State to provisionally
apply it, either pending the agreement’s entry into force (such as the Paris Agreement90) or
its entry into force for that State (such as the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol91).
Such provisions can have the effect of both accelerating and broadening implementation of
the agreement’s terms.

24. INVOLVEMENT OF NON-PARTY STATES
Even where an agreement has not succeeded in attracting States as formal
participants, its processes may still invite their engagement.

Many multilateral

environmental agreements provide for non-Parties to participate as observers at meetings,
where they may enjoy many of the (non-voting) rights of Parties.92 Such participation may
ultimately enable them to join the agreement. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, for
example, several large developing countries were non-Parties until after the adoption of its
1990 London Amendment, which they heavily influenced (by the inclusion, inter alia, of a
new Multilateral Fund).

See Article IV of the Kigali Amendment, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/document/fulltext-kigali-amendment-pt-1.
90 See paragraph 5 of COP Decision 1/CP.21,
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
91 See Article V of the Kigali Amendment, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/unep/document/fulltext-kigali-amendment-pt-1.
92 See, e.g., Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
89
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25. PARTICIPATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS
The Paris Agreement reflects an unusual approach to the engagement of subnational governments and other non-State actors, including businesses and NGOs. While
only a State or regional economic integration organization may formally join the
Agreement, the larger Paris outcome invites the participation of so-called “non-Party
stakeholders” in various processes that contribute to the climate goals of the Agreement.93
The engagement of cities, states, regions, companies, etc., will normally take place alongside
that of a State Party; however, it might also substitute for the participation of a Party, as will
likely be the case should the United States ultimately withdraw from the Agreement.

26. OTHER EXAMPLES

Several other means have been used to gain wider participation.
o Some agreements make clear that an environmental agreement, particularly one
related to trade, is not intended to affect rights and obligations under other
international agreements.94 (In order to address the concerns of other States, they
may also include clauses to make clear that the particular legal hierarchy in that
case, i.e., that the environment agreement is not intended to affect other
agreements -- which would include trade agreements -- should not be understood
as a political hierarchy of trade agreements over environmental agreements.)95

See paragraphs 116 et seq. of COP Decision 1/CP.21,
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
94 See, e.g., preambular paragraph 9 of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/RotterdamConventionText/ta
bid/1160/language/en-US/Default.aspx, and preambular paragraph 10 of the Biosafety Protocol,
https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/.
95 See, e.g., preambular paragraph 10 of the Rotterdam Convention and preambular paragraph 11
of the Biosafety Protocol.
93
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o Some agreements include “principles,” in addition to commitments, in order to
accommodate those States that consider it necessary to have the agreement capture
a particular viewpoint or lay down a concept to inform the future development of
the regime. The UNFCCC contains such an article,96 as do the Biodiversity and
Desertification Conventions.97
o In some contexts, agreements provide an assurance to sensitive States that a
provision is not intended to infringe upon Parties’ sovereignty. For example, the
Ramsar Convention makes clear that inclusion of a wetland in the International
List of Wetlands of International Importance does not prejudice “exclusive
sovereign rights of the Contracting Party in whose territory it is situated. 98 The
Paris Agreement provides that its transparency framework will be implemented in
a manner that, inter alia, is “respectful of national sovereignty.”99
o To the extent that an agreement provides for elaborating rules or guidelines to be
adopted by a particular deadline (such as the first meeting of the Conference of the
Parties), States may have an incentive to join in time to influence the outcome.

States have developed a wealth of ideas for encouraging participation in multilateral
environmental agreements, whether by literally joining or, less formally, by carrying out
key commitments from the outside. As noted, participation in an agreement is one, but not
the only, important factor in the design of an agreement. Certain accommodations may so
weaken an agreement that its environmental objective is no longer served. Others, even if

See Article 3 of the UNFCCC,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/co
nveng.pdf.
97 See Article 3 of the Biodiversity Convention and Article 3 of the Desertification Convention.
98 See Article 2.3 of the Ramsar Convention, http://archive.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documentstexts-convention-on/main/ramsar/1-31-38%5E20671_4000_0__.
99 See Article 13.3 of the Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.
96
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consistent with an agreement’s environmental objective, may attract some countries but
deter others. In addition, one agreement’s set of enticements and accommodations may not
work for another agreement. Whether particular choices were wise ones is beyond the
scope of this paper, but may be worth studying.
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